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Abstract
Coalition forming is investigated among countries, which are coupled with short range
interactions, under the influence of external fields produced by the existence of global alliances.
The model rests on the natural model of coalition forming inspired from Statistical Physics,
where instabilities are a consequence of decentralized maximization of the individual benefits
of actors within their long horizon of rationality as the ability to envision a way through
intermediate loosing states, to a better configuration. The effects of those external incentives
on the interactions between countries and the eventual stabilization of coalitions are studied.
The results shed a new light on the understanding of the complex phenomena of stabilization
and fragmentation in the coalition dynamics and on the possibility to design stable coalitions.
In addition to the formal implementation of the model, the phenomena is illustrated through
some historical cases of conflicts in Western Europe.
Keywords: Social Models, Statistical Physics, Coalition Forming, Coalition Stabilization,
Political Instability.
1 Introduction
This work is devoted to the study of stabilization in coalition forming in a collective of individual
actors under the influence of external fields. The model rests on the natural model of coalition
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forming [1] inspired from the Statistical Physics’ model of Spin Glasses [2], through which the
system of countries is compared to a collection of interacting spins – tiny magnetic dipoles that
interact with each other and align themselves in a way to attain the most ”comfortable” position,
the one that minimizes their energies. While the presentation addresses the coalition forming in
an aggregate of countries, the discussion and the results can be applied to any type of political,
social or economical collectives where the association of actors takes place based on their bilateral
propensities.
This work subscribes to the growing field of modeling complex social situations using Statistical
Physics [3] which has started over thirty years ago with [4]. Later, a study of collective decision
making combining Social Psychology hypotheses with recent concept of Statistical Physics [5] set
the frame of using spin Hamiltonian. Then, the coalition as a form of aggregation among a set
of actors (countries, groups, individuals) has been studied using concepts from the theory of Spin
Glasses [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Various social applications of the model were suggested [12, 13, 1]. The
dynamical analogue of this model was introduced in [14].
The model of coalition forming among countries leans on the existence of strong and static
bilateral geographic-ethnic propensities linking the countries. Those propensities have emerged
during the ongoing historical interactions between neighbor countries and appear to favor either
cooperation or conflict. Their spontaneous and independent evolution have produced an intricate
circuit of bilateral bonds which causes contradictory tendencies in the simultaneous individual
searches for optimal coalitions. Due to stronger interactions with a common ally, conflicting coun-
tries may be brought to cooperate momentarily despite their natural tendency to conflict. Such a
situation produces an endeavor of the concerned countries to escape from the unfavorable coopera-
tion leading to instabilities, which in turn produce a break down of the current coalitions inducing
the formation of new ones.
The origin of such instability is twofold, either coming from spontaneous fluctuations or directed
by external attraction towards a global alliance. The extremely disordered dynamics of coalitions
and fragmentation in Western Europe in past centuries belong to the first kind, while the building
up of the Soviet and Nato global alliances is of the second kind.
In this work we aim to study the instability of coalition forming among countries, which, in
contrast to physical entities, are rational actors that are able to maximize their individual benefits
through a series of choices within a decentralized maximization process.
On this basis, coalitions are formed through the short range interactions between the countries
– the attraction or repulsion based on the unalterable historical bonds between them. According
to the principle that ” the enemy of an enemy is a friend”, the countries are assumed to ally to
one of two competing coalitions.
Allying to the same coalition is unfavorable to the countries which went through historical
rejection. As a result, such countries seek to affiliate with the opposite coalitions. Alternatively,
allying to the opposite coalition is unfavorable to friendly countries. Countries which belong to
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the same coalition are expected to cooperate even if their natural propensity is to conflict. Such a
contradiction results in a potential instability.
Our previous study [1] focused on studying the effects of instabilities arising in the coalition
forming among rational actors as a function of the bonds structure, the optimal and non-optimal
stabilizations as well as the robustness of the stability.
In this work the model is extended to investigate the mechanisms by which the setting of a
global alliance produces attraction in an aggregate of individual countries otherwise connected by
their natural bilateral propensities. In particular, the focus is on how those new interactions can
eventually stabilize the intrinsically unstable process of coalition forming keeping the short range
nature of interactions. Global attraction is ensued from a global external field set over the system
of countries, which in turn polarizes the countries’ interests and produces incentive unifications
under two opposing global alliances. The resulting coalitions are affected by the net bilateral
balance between the new motivations and the traditional historical ones.
We focus on how the interactions produced by attraction to global alliances overwhelm the
current instability among the countries. The results provide new theoretical tools that enable to
measure the efficiency of a global attraction in forming stable alliances, as well as to theoretically
design new effective global attractions that can yield stability.
The study of stabilization of coalitions using global alliances was started in [12]. The authors
describe spontaneous formation of economic coalitions given a random distribution of propensity
bonds, and illustrate new exchanges between the countries incited by the global alliances. Those
exchanges, along with an additional parameter of economical and military pressure, are viewed as
the ones that produce additional bilateral propensities yielding new stable coalitions.
In the current work, we develops further the research on coalition forming under a global
external field. We address the stabilization by unique factors – such as economical, political, social,
ecological, as well as by multi-factor stabilization, where the influence of several independent factors
is equiprobable. Based on the new formulation, we investigate the remarkable historical cases of
conflicts in Western Europe.
The multi-factor stabilization is an innovative concept both in Political Sciences where it ex-
plains the complexity of coalition forming, and in Statistical Physics where it illustrates how a
stable disorder arises from an anti-ferromagnetic coupling achieved by the interlocking of two op-
posite ferromagnetic states. Some forms of such mixed phases of ferromagnetism have been studied
in [15].
2 Background – The Natural Model and Instability
The Spin Glass model in Statistical Physics is an idealized model of bulk magnetism represented
by a collection of interacting spins – atoms acting as a tiny dipole magnet with a mixture of
ferromagnetic and anti-ferromagnetic couplings. Those magnets interact with each other seeking
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to align themselves parallel or anti-parallel in order to minimize their energies. The collection
of spins forms a disordered material in which the competing interactions cause high magnetic
frustration – changes of spins at no energy cost, with a highly degenerate ground state.
The Ising model of a random bond magnetic system can be described as follows. The model
consists of N discrete variables {Si}
N
1
, called spins, that can be in one of two states up or down.
Figure (1) shows schematically the case of 8 spins with identical amplitude of the propensity bonds
located on a lattice and interacting at most with their nearest neighbors. The spins for which a
shift of the state cost no energy are defined as frustrated.
Figure 1: Ising model of 8-spins with mixed pair interactions. The pair propensity bonds are
denoted by + or −, and states of the spins are denoted by the arrows. Frustrated spins are marked
by both up and down arrows. This Spin Glass phase yields an unstable disorder.
The natural model of coalition forming is formally identical to the Ising model with pure or
mixed anti-ferromagnetic couplings in a particular geometry of the lattice. the model considers a
system of N countries whose historical interactions have defined propensity bonds between them,
which are either positive (ferromagnetic-like) or negative (anti-ferromagnetic-like). To each country
labeled with an index i ranging from 1 to N , is attached a discrete variables Si which can assume
one of two state values Si = +1 or Si = −1. The values correspond to the country’s choice
between the two possible coalitions. The same choice allies two countries to the same coalition,
while different choices separate them into the opposite coalitions.
Combination of states of all the countries S = {S1, S2, S3, . . . , SN} forms a state configuration
that defines an allocation of coalitions. Here, by symmetry, both configuration S and it’s inverse
−S = {−S1,−S2,−S3, . . . ,−SN} define the same coalitions.
Bilateral propensities Ji,j have emerged from the respective mutual historical experience be-
tween the countries i and j. The propensities measure the amplitudes and the directions of the
exchange between two countries – cooperation or conflict. Ji,j , which is symmetric, is zero when
there are no direct exchanges between the countries.
Product JijSiSj measures the benefit or the gain from the interactions between both the
countries as a function of their choices. Aimed to maximize this measure, the countries seek
to ally to the same coalition when Jij is positive and to the opposing ones, otherwise. Thus,
depending on the direction of the primary propensity, the conflict can be beneficial to the same
extent as the cooperation.
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The sum of the benefits from all the interactions of country i in the system makes up the net
gain of the country:
Hi(S) = Si
∑
j 6=i JijSj . (1)
Thus, a configuration S that maximizes the gain function defines the country’s most beneficial
coalition setting.
For the sake of visualization, we depict the system of countries through a connected weighted
graph with the countries in the nodes and the bilateral propensities as the weights of the respective
edges (see Figure (2)). We take red (dark) color for the +1 choice and blue (light) color for the
−1 choice.
Figure 2: Triangle of three conflicting countries 1, 2, 3 with negative mutual bonds.
The total gain of the system of countries is identical to the Hamiltonian of an Ising random
bond magnetic system which represents the energy of the system. For a configuration S, we have
for system’s gain :
H(S) = 1
2
∑
i Hi(S). (2)
In physical systems, the Hamiltonian – the function that determines the physical properties of
the spin system, is precisely concerned with minimization of the system’s energy. This physical
analogy allows to address the bilateral propensities between the countries as mean of maximization
of the countries’ individual gain (minimization of their energy) and as the principal guide in the
coalition forming.
A major difference between the model of spins and the model of rational countries is the long
horizon rationality of the countries in contrast to the spins, which are only able to foresee only the
immediate effect of their shifts. Countries have the ability to maximize their individual benefits
through a series of planned changes while assuming possible losses in the intermediate phase.
The Ising model, indeed, can be represented through the natural model where the countries’
rationality is limited to observation of an immediate gain, optimizing only their local maximums.
When the most beneficial coalition configurations of different countries do not coincide, the
maximization of individual gains induces competitions for the beneficial associations. Among the
countries with complete rationality which are aware of attainability of a better configuration, those
competing interactions cause endless instability in the system. However, the system may remain
stable when some actors have limited rationality – being unaware of possibility to attain a better
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configuration, they are satisfied having reached a local maximum.
Figure (3) shows the triangle of conflict in a configuration where it is stable when the coun-
tries 2’s and 3’s rationality is limited to immediate improvements; any change cause a loss in
their gain. The triangle is unstable when the countries are fully rational: their most ben-
eficial configurations S1 = {{+1,−1,−1}, {−1,+1,+1}}, S2 = {{−1,+1,−1}, {+1,−1,+1}},
S3 = {{−1,−1,+1}, {+1,+1,−1}}, do not coincide. Here, at any coalition configuration, at
least two of the countries improves their gain when the other changes. As a result, aiming in their
best configurations and being able to forecast an improvement at any step, the countries may make
changes that impair the gain in the immediate steps.
Figure 3: The triangle of conflict. The triangle is stable when the countries 2’s and 3’s rationality is
limited to immediate improvements; any change cause a loss in their gain. The triangle is unstable
when the countries are fully rational: their most beneficial configurations do not coincide and
the countries, being able to forecast an improvement, make changes that impair the gain in the
immediate steps.
It is interesting to note that for the case of equal propensities over the edges, the triangle of
conflict is unstable for any limited rationality actors, including the spins, due to zero-value gain
produced in the cyclic geometry resulting in no-cost frustrations.
Definition 1 (Instability of the System of Countries) The system of countries is said to be
unstable if in any configuration of the countries’ states there is a country which is able to forecast
an improvement of its gain.
Negative product on a circle means an unpaired negative coupling where two neighbors are found
to be connected both though positive and negative branch in the circle. This creates an everlasting
competition between the neighbors for the exclusive arrangement to ally with the positive branch.
The countries thereby continuously shift their respective choices producing the instability.
In Statistical physics the necessary condition of instabilities in Spin Glasses [16] reads that
the instability implies the existance of a closed circle of spins connected with the bonds on which
the product of total bonds is negative.
(3)
Indeed, the Spin Glasses’ instability is a result of frustrations, and a negative circle can appear to
be stable as soon as a shift increases the spin energy preventing the spin flop.
In contrast to the Spin Glass model where changes are limited to the spontaneous no-cost
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fluctuations, in the natural model where the instability is due to the rationality of actors, changes
may impair the immediate gain. In the theoretical interpretation of the model where the complete
rationality of all countries is assumed, the terms (3) are also the sufficient condition of the insta-
bility in the model – the condition of endless competitions among the countries for the beneficial
configurations.
Formally, the theoretical terms of instability in the natural model are as follows. Denote a
circle of countries by C and the countries composing the circle by 1, 2, . . . , k.
If there is a closed circle of countries on which the product of total propensities is negative,
Πi,j∈C pij < 0
then the system is unstable.
(4)
Let us remark that, in the theoretical interpretation of the model where the complete rationality
of all countries is assumed, the instability is not value-dependent but is determined by the signs of
the propensities – the distribution is such that involves a negative circle. At the same time, any
local maximum strictly depends on the propensities’ values.
3 Global Alliance Model Of Coalition Forming
Global alliance model starts from a global principle which represents an external field polarizing
the interests of the countries. This leads to the emergence of two opposing global alliances. The
countries attach themselves to one or to the other based on their pragmatic interests with respect
to the global principle. The new interactions, while favor either cooperation or conflict, stimulates
contributions to the countries’ mutual propensities. The new prospectives unify or separate the
countries based on the pragmatic motivations which in combination with the historical concerns
allow other distributions of coalitions.
Here we address the role of the global alliances in forming of stable coalitions among the coun-
tries or other rational actors. Whether the system is unstable or there is an optimal or local
maximum stable configuration, the new exchanges between the countries incited by the global
alliances impact the stability. For the sake of simplicity of presentation, we assume the exten-
sive rationality of the countries. While in such theoretical interpretation the instability is not
value-dependent, the effect from the globally generated additional propensities on the stability is
subject to the values of primary propensities. Therefore, in spite of the extensive rationality of the
countries, in the presentation we address the model with arbitrary range of values.
Let us define the global alliance model formally. The global alliance unifies the countries that
support the global principle, while its opponents are unified under the opposing global alliance.
Denote the two alliances by M and C. A country’s individual disposition to the alliances is
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determined by the countries’ cultural and historical experiences and is expressed through the
parameter of natural belonging. The natural belonging parameter of country i is ǫi = +1 if the
country has natural attraction to alliance M , ǫi = −1 for C.
By making a choice among the two possible state values Si = +1 and Si = −1, country i
chooses to belong to either alliance M or C. The choice of +1 allies the country to alliance M
and the choice of −1 allies it to alliance C. Any particular distribution of two countries among the
alliances creates new interactions between the countries whose directions depends on the natural
disposition of the countries. Namely, if the countries are attracted to the opposing alliances, the
exchange will be negative as soon as they ally to the same alliance.
Those new exchanges between any two countries i and j define additional propensity between
the countries. The propensity is the amplitude of the exchange Gij in the direction ǫiǫj that favors
either cooperation or conflict. For the purpose of this presentation we assume that the exchange
amplitudes are unchanged.
The overall propensities between the countries, involving both the historical inclinations and
the propensities resulting from the new exchanges, are determined as follows
pij = Jij + ǫiǫjGij . (5)
Respectively, the net gain of country i is
Hi = Si
∑
j 6=i (Jij + ǫiǫjGij)Sj . (6)
Thus, in the presence of external incentives of the global alliances, the couplings between the
countries obtain new guidance. The countries adjust their states to the best benefit with regards
to the new propensities. The new choice of coalition is determined by both spontaneous reactions
and planned interactions, which enable coupling based on a planned profit.
4 Stabilization Of The System By Additional Factors
Here we address the stabilization of coalition forming in the system where rational countries have
no optimal configuration of coalitions, and where, as result, the spontaneous stabilization can not
be attained. Global alliances based interactions in such systems enable stable coalitions among
the actors even if they remain of short-range nature. Such interactions, however, being a complex
superposition of several factors of countries’ objectives, must satisfy particular stability constraints.
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4.1 The Uni-Factor Stabilization
Consider two opposing global alliances M and C in a system of N countries. A particular factor
of the countries’ interests produces specific dispositions to the global alliances which encourage
new exchanges between the countries. The appropriate amplitudes of the exchanges enable the
stabilization among the countries, the uni-factor stabilization.
With respect of unique factor of stabilization, the necessary and sufficient condition stability
(reformulated terms (4)) is that
A system is stable if and only if for any circle C in the system,
Πi,j∈C (Jij + ǫiǫjGij) ≥ 0.
(7)
Now we state the existence of a stable coalition within the global alliance model.
Statement 1 The presence of global alliances, regardless of the global principle that produced
them, enables a stable coalition among countries.
In order to prove this statement, let us first observe that the product of the additional propen-
sities pGij = ǫiǫjGij on any circle is always positive. Indeed, given circle C,
Πi,j∈C Gij ǫiǫj = Πi,j∈C Gij(ǫ1ǫ2ǫ3 . . . ǫk)
2 = Πi,j∈C Gij .
This implies that on any circle, the number of negative couplings produced by the global alliances
is even. If the system is unstable, than there is at least one negative circle. We define the new
interaction amplitude as follows. For each couple i, j whose ǫiǫj < 0 we take Gij = 0 if the primary
propensity is negative and Gij = 2|Jij | for the positive original coupling. When ǫiǫj > 0, we take
Gij = 2|Jij |.
Making the new propensities negative for the negative global couplings and positive for the
positive ones, guarantees that there is an even number of negative couplings on the circle. This
remains invariant for each circle in the system, which implies that the construction produces non-
negative product on any circle in the system. The stability condition (7) holds true which concludes
the proof of the statement.
4.1.1 A Case of the England-Spain-France Triangle
A typical examples of the uni-factor stabilization is stabilization of the triangle of England, Spain
and France (4) during historical events of 1584 [17].
Example 1 ( Stabilization in the ESF Triangle of Conflict by the Religious Factor )
Against the background of sequence of wars in the old Europe, the countries attained stability
when in 1584 Catholic Spain and France formed an alliance against Protestant forces, the most
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notable of which were settled in England.
In order to illustrate historical example using the global alliance model, we describe the propen-
sities between the countries from ”negative” to ”positive” through mixed ones. Attaching to them
numerical values with respect to their relative strength, taking ”neutral” as 0.
Accounting for the historical relationship between England, Spain and France, we take the
propensities as ”neutral-negative”, ”negative” and ”highly negative”. There numerical interpreta-
tions, as shown in Figure (4), are arbitrary values that aim to account for a relative strength of
the interactions.
Figure 4: Triangle of England (E), Spain (S) and France (F ), the ESF -conflicting triangle.
ByM and C we denote the two opposing global alliances – the countries inM choose unification
into a ”European union” and those in C are against the unification. With respect to the religious
factor, Catholic Spain and France were naturally associated to M (ǫS , ǫF = 1), while Protestant
England was associated to C (ǫE = −1). Then, ǫSǫF = 1, ǫEǫS = ǫEǫF = −1, and the overall
propensities between the three countries are:
pSE = −3−GSE , pEF = −1−GEF and pSF = −2 +GSF .
Solving the inequality
(−3−GSE)(−1 −GEF )(−2 +GSF ) ≥ 0 (8)
yields the constraint the new interaction amplitudes GSE , GEF , GSF must satisfy in order to
stabilize the triangle. Since GEF , GSE and GSF > 0, the only root of the respective equality is
GSF = 2. The solution space is GSF ≥ 2, as depicted in Figure (5), represents a three-dimensional
space of the independent additional propensities.
In the historical example, coalition of Spain and France against England implies that the am-
plitude of their new interaction belonged to the solution space. The respective stable configuration
is S = (+1,−1,−1), as shown in Figure (6)) where GEF , GSE are taken to be 0 and GSF to be 3,
so that the corresponding total propensities become −1,−3 and 1.
It is interesting to observe that:
Statement 2 Any system of countries in the global alliance model with a unique factor of interests
is reducible to a stable system represented in the natural model.
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Figure 5: Three-dimensional solution space of the independent additional propensities in the uni-
factor stabilization of the ESF - triangle of conflict.
Figure 6: The global alliances model of the ESF -triangle stabilized by the religious factor in
configuration S = (+1,−1,−1). Here, GEF = GSE = 0 , GSF = 3, so that the respective
resulting total propensities are −1,−3 and 1.
Indeed, given a system in the global alliance model, let us define the new state variable to be
τi = ǫiSi. The variable takes a value of {+1,−1}. Then, the hamiltonian Hi of country i can be
written in the terms of the new state variables as
Hi =
∑
i6=j (JijSiSj +GijǫiǫjSiSj) =
∑
i6=j (Jijǫiǫj +Gij)τiτj .
Here, since Gij is positive, some choice of {Gij}i,j produces the propensities that guarantee a
stable system.
4.2 The Multi-Factor Stabilization
Taking into account only one factor of countries’ interests would be too restricting – along with
religious interests, the global principle may impact economical, ecological, moral, political or any
other interest and concern. Distinct interests simultaneously influence the interactions between
the countries in different ways. They modify the countries’ propensities by aggregating the corre-
sponding independent interactions – economical, political and others.
Let us define formally the multi-factor form of the global alliance model through two coexisting
factors of interests, denoted by G and K respectively. Within each factor, a country has independent
natural disposition to the global alliances. Therefore, each country has two independent natural
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belonging parameters associated with the factors. For country i, this is ǫi = +1 if within factor G
the country naturally belongs to M . Similarly, βi = +1 within factor K. For the global alliance
C, ǫi = −1 and βi = −1 respectively.
We denote by Gij the amplitude of the exchanges between the countries i and j on factor G,
and by Kij the amplitude on K. Then, the total new propensity between the countries i and j is
the superposition of those directed exchanges on the two factors: pGij = ǫiǫjGij and p
K
ij = βiβjKij .
The two-factor form of the global alliance model superposes the spontaneous interactions of the
natural model with the intended interactions based on the two-dimensional choice among the global
alliances: pij = Jij + ǫiǫjGij + βiβjKij . The net gain of country i is
Hi = Si
∑
j 6=i Sj(Jij +Gijǫiǫj +Kijβiβj).
In order to illustrate the multi-factor stabilization, we turn again to the Example (1) of stabi-
lization of the ESF - conflicting triangle.
4.2.1 Multi-factor Stabilization of the England-Spain-France Triangle
We assume, in addition to the religious factor G in the ESF - conflicting triangle, that there
is an economical factor K. In this golden age Spain had a pronounced disinclination to any
economical unification with its old enemies, while England and France remarked the advantages of
such unification. Therefore, the respective parameters of natural belonging on the economical factor
K are βS = −1 and βE , βF = 1. With respect to the economical factor, the overall propensities
between the countries are : pSE = −3 − GSE − KSE, pEF = −1 − GEF + KEF , and pSF =
−2 +GSF −KSF .
Solutions of inequality
Πi,j∈C pij = (−3−GSE −KSE)(−1−GEF +KEF )(−2 +GSF −KSF ) ≥ 0 (9)
yield the exchange amplitudes that guarantee stability of the ESF -triangle in the multi-factor
form. Since GSE +KSE ≥ 0, the solution must satisfy −GEF +KEF ≥ 1 and GSF −KSF ≤ 2, or
−GEF +KEF ≤ 1 and GSF −KSF ≥ 2 (see Figure (7)).
In the historical reality of this period of the countries, the economical factor K could not
produce interactions as strong and significant as the exchanges on the religious factor. That is
why KEF < 1 + GEF and KSF < GSF + 2 which have prevented the ESF -triangle to reach the
stability until religion took a secondary place conceding importance to economics. See Figure (8)),
where GSE is taken to be 0, GEF to be 2 and GSF is 3, so that the respective total propensities
become 1, −3, 1.
It worth to notice that in the multi-factor form, a system in the global alliance model can
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Figure 7: three-dimensional solution spaces of the independent additional propensities in the two-
factor stabilization of the ESF -triangle.
Figure 8: The global alliances model of the ESF -triangle in the multi-factor case. Here, GSE = 0,
GEF = 2 and GSF = 3, so that the respective total propensities become 1, −3, 1. The system
remained unstable because the global exchange amplitudes did not satisfy the terms of stability –
the circle remained negative.
be no more interpreted as a system in the natural model as soon as the choice of at least two
countries differs on at least two factors. Still, the general multi-factor case can be reduced to the
two-factor form of the global alliance model: one of the factors unifies the amplitudes of all the
positive coupling and the other unifies those of all the negatives ones.
Therefore, with no restriction on the generality, the multi-factor form of global alliance model
can be studied within the case of two coexisting factors. This also explains the fact that in the
majority of cases, only two camps of opposing concerns play the crucial role in the coalition forming.
5 Physical Interpretation of the Multi-Factor Stabilization
In the context of Statistical Physics, the multi-factor stabilization is equivalent to the superposition
of unstable disorder of a spin glass with two stable orders (two factors) of ferromagnetic states
which split the spins in two directions (two alliances). Each spin’s absolute direction is the average
of those ferromagnetic directions, as shown in Figure (9)). Among the two opposite directions,
either one of them dominates or the two eliminate each other, thus neutralizing the ferromagnetic
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states on the spin. In the figure, thick arrows indicate the absolute directions of the spins, and
thin arrows show their ferromagnetic directions.
Figure 9: Ising model of 8-spins, initially mixed negative and positive pair interactions (highlighted
by grey color), is stabilized by mixing of two ferromagnetic states. Each spin’s absolute direction
(marked by the thick arrows) is the average of those ferromagnetic directions. Among the two
opposite directions, either one of them dominates or the two eliminate each other, thus neutralizing
the ferromagnetic states on the spin. The Spin Glass phase yields a stable disorder.
The multi-factor stabilization of coalition forming is an innovative concept both in Political
Sciences and in Statistical Physics. In the former, it explains the multitude of elements influencing
the coalition forming. In the later, it shows how in a frustrated system a stable disorder is achieved
from interlocking of two ferromagnetic states of opposite directions with anti-ferromagnetic cou-
pling among them.
6 Multi-factor Stabilization in Western Europe
Here we attempt to illustrate the formation of Italian state within the context of the global alliance
model. It is known that, given a system from the reality, it is hard to obtain exact numerical values
of the propensities in the system. Once such values are known we can explain the transitions and
predict resulting configurations with arguable precision. Having no such values, we still can provide
some analysis based on estimated values of the propensities extracted from the historical chronicles.
Running the model with those values allows to analyze and explain the transitions and the result
configuration. This can not be done based only on the canonical representations of historical
events.
Let us illustrate the Italian unification in 1856 - 1858, where four countries were involved: Italy,
France, Russia and Austria [18] and [19]. The period from the end of 18th till the middle of 19th
century was marked by the series of European wars including the French invasion of Italy where
Austrian and Sardinian forces had to face French army in the War of the First Coalition, The War
of the Fifth Coalition of Austria against French Empire.
In 1852, the new president of the Council of Ministers in an Italian region Piedmont, Camillo
di Cavour, had expansionist ambitions one of which was to displace the Austrians from the Italian
peninsula. An attempt to acquire British and French favor was however unsuccessful.
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Then, Napoleon III, who had belonged to an Italian family originally, decided to make a sig-
nificant gesture for Italy. In the summer of 1858, Cavour and Napoleon III agreed to cooperate on
war against Austria. According to the agreement, Piedmont would be rewarded with the Austrian
territories in Italy (Lombardy and Venice), as well as the Duchies of Parma and Modena, while
France would gain Piedmont’s transalpine territories of Savoy and Nice.
Despite the Russian help in crushing the Hungarian Revolt in 1849, Austria failed to support
Russia in the Crimean War of the middle of 1850s. Therefore, Austria could not count on Russian
help in Italy and Germany. Alexander II has agreed to support France in a fight with Austria for
the liberation of the Italians, though only by showing up the army on its borders with Austria. It
appeared to be enough to force the Austrians withdrew behind the borders of Venice.
However, the conquest of Venice required a long and bloody mission, which may cause revolts
and threaten Napoleon III’s position in France. In the private meeting with Franz Joseph, together
they agreed on the principles of a settlement to the conflict according to which the Austrians have
to cede Savoy and Nice to the French, yet would retain Venice. The Russian was indignant at this
turn of France.
Let us reproduce the historical chronicle presented above with the help of our model. The
initial states of the countries with their primary propensities are shown in Figure (10).
The value of propensities indicating the relative strength of primary interactions between the
countries are taken from ”negative” to ”positive” through mixed ones with the respective numerical
values taking ”neutral” as 0 are shown in Figure 10. Thus, the historical relationships between the
two absolutist monarchies Russia and Austria are estimated as ”neutral” with JRA = 1. Italy and
Russia having no noticeable political relationship are ”neutral” to each other. The Franco-Russian
relationship built up during the French Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars is are rather
”neutral-negative” with JFR = −1, as well as the interactions of France with Italy and Austria
who had experienced series of military conflicts. The opposition between Italy and Austria tied to
the mutual territorial claims is estimated to be ”significantly-negative” with JIA = −2).
Figure 10: The unstable system of France, Russia, Italy, Austria with their relative primary
propensities, 1856-1858.
Figure (10) shows the system of the countries in its natural model. The model has two negative
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circles and so is unstable which appears through the historical changes before the rise of the
Italian question. The instability originates from the fact that France gets identical benefits from
the alliance with Russia and Italy as from the opposing alliance with Austria.
An external field in the model results from the principle of independent state of Italy. The
respective opposing global alliances are M which associates the countries that support the inde-
pendence of Italy, and C which unifies the countries opposing the independence.
Here, two respective factors influencing the historical series of events must be distinguished:
external politics with the military goals, and internal politics involving the social concerns of the
countries (their governing classes). Denote the two factors by G and K respectively.
With respect to their external goals, Italy and France, as well as Russia, agree to the relevance
of an independent state of Italy. Yet, in the social concerns the governing classes of France, Russia
and Austria agree in their rejection of socialist ideas springing over all the Italy. Therefore, the
respective parameters of the countries’ natural belonging to the alliances are distributed as follows.
With the natural belonging parameter ǫ referring the external goals and β referring the internal
social politics, for France ǫF = +1 and βF = −1, for Italy ǫI = +1 and βI = +1, for Russia
ǫR = +1 and βR = −1, and for Austria ǫA = −1 and βA = −1.
The global alliance motivated propensities are given is the following chart:
Propensity F-I I-A F-R F-A R-A
Primary -1 -2 -1 -1 1
On G GFI −GIA GFR −GFA −GRA
On K −KFI −KIA KFR KFA KRA
The historical chronicle of the four countries is concluded in three phases: a phase of no global
alliances, or the natural model phase, and two phases of global alliances rose due to the Italian
question, where in the first one the external and military concerns come to picture and in the
second one the internal social concerns rise over the countries.
As we have seen in Figure (10), the system in its natural model is unstable, where France
fluctuates between Russia and Austria.
Let us evaluated the amplitudes of the military exchanges between the countries through nu-
merical values providing the relative magnitudes of interactions. Russia has equally ”moderate”
interest in military cooperation with both France and Austria, with GFR = 2 and GRA = 2. Italy
and France are ”strongly” interested in the conflict having Italian land at stake, GFI = 4 and
GIA = 4, while the interest between Austria and France is ”moderately-strong” with GFA = 3.
A sympathy of Russian to Italian state comes up in the ”basic” interest, GRI = 1. The new
propensities between the countries with respect to the external politics interests are shown in the
following table:
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Propensity F-I I-A F-R F-A R-A R-I
Primary -1 -2 -1 -1 1 0
On G 4 -4 2 -3 -2 1
Total 3 -6 1 -4 -1 1
As result of the interactions the system obtain a new shape shown in Figure (11). Here, absence
of negative circles allow a perfectly stable coalition of France, Italy and Russia against Austria .
Figure 11: France, Russia, Italy and Austria, 1856-1858, with the new military propensities. It
forms a stable system with the coalition of France, Italy and Russia against Austria.
However, the social aspect of the internal politics of the countries dramatically interferes with
the stability. The relative amplitudes of the consequent exchanges can be estimated as follows.
Due to the political insularity of Russia where serfdom still prevailed over large part of the country,
the amplitudes of all its exchanges on the social aspect are ”negligible”, KFR = 0 and KRA = 0.
France and Austria had a ”strong” involvement in the subject, with KFA = KFI = KIA = 4. The
new propensities between the countries are shown in the table.
Propensity F-I I-A F-R F-A R-A R-I
Primary -1 -2 -1 -1 1 0
On G 4 -4 2 -3 -2 1
On K -4 -4 0 4 0 0
Total -1 -10 1 0 -1 1
The result system with the French change in favor of cooperation with Austria is shown in
Figure (12). As we can see the modified system includes three negative circles. The change of
France put Russia in an unfavorable position moving it away from a most beneficial coalition
configuration. At the same time, Italy and Austria found themselves in a satisfactory state.
7 Conclusions
Coalitions in a collective of individual rational actors such as countries, when formed spontaneously
are rare to stabilize. The probability that the system becomes stable vanishes exponentially with
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Figure 12: France, Russia, Italy, Austria, 1856-1858, with the new propensities on both the military
and social factors. The result of the war for liberation of Italy is the instability in a new shape.
the size of the system. In reality, stabilization among countries as rational actors is more likely to
happen under the external incentive of global alliances and is more practical. The impact of the
global principle on the economical, political, social or any other factor of the countries’ interests
produces new, intended, interactions between the countries. In contrast to the spontaneous primary
interactions, those interactions are intended in the sense that they are based on the directed view
of the countries’s needs and interests. Superposed with the spontaneous ones, the interactions
guarantee the stabilization once their amplitudes satisfy the constraints of positive circuits of
propensities.
One of the interesting directions for further research in the context of the global alliance model
is to study the general effect from the global attractions, that is the general interaction amplitudes.
While some global attractions represent efficient mediators, the others may be less successful or
even harmful with respect to the system’s stability. Because either they become obsolete, or
provide no sufficient motivations, or they acts with harmful intentions, the global alliance may fail
to stabilize an unstable system, and even may destabilize a stable system. It is interesting to study
those effects from general perspective of the system’s total gain (energy), which can be reduced or
augmented by the global alliances. The study should help shed the new light on conflicts in post
colonial Africa and Middle East which, being under the influence of external fields, continuously
cycle in series of contentions.
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